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Articles
Ecocide and Genocide in Iraq:
International Law, the Marsh
Arabs, and Environmental
Damage in Non-International
Conflicts

Aaron Schwabach

I. INTRODUCTION
Modem warfare has the potential to inflict enormous damage upon the
natural environment. In the post-Cold War world, few areas have suffered
greater environmental harm from wartime military activities than the area in
and around Iraq. Three of the most extreme instances were inflicted by the
former Iraqi government. In the first Gulf War, Iraqi forces set fire to 600
of Kuwait's oil wells and uncapped or damaged 175 more.' During the
same conflict at least six million barrels of oil were deliberately discharged
into the Persian Gulf,2 adding to the already considerable damage wrought
by routine oil industry operations and the hundreds of attacks on tankers
and oil facilities during the Iran-Iraq war.3 And following the unsuccessful
. Aaron Schwabach received a J.D. from the University of California at Berkeley,
Boalt Hall, in 1989. He is currently a Professor of Law at Thomas Jefferson School of
Law.
1. The Spoils of War: What Can the Past Tell About the Effect of Military Conflict
on the Environment?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 2003 [hereinafter "Spoils of War"].
2. Id.
3. See Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment of the EnvironmentalLaw of
InternationalArmed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 14 (1997).
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Shiite rebellion of 1991, Saddam Hussein's government drained the
marshlands of Southern Iraq in a successful effort to destroy the lifestyle
and culture of the Shiite Ma'Dan, or Marsh Arabs.4
The illegality of the Iraqi actions against the environment during the
Gulf War, which resulted in an unprecedented imposition of damages for
environmental harm, 5 has been fully discussed elsewhere. 6 The plight of
the Marsh Arabs has received less attention from legal scholars than
perhaps it should, possibly owing to a lack of information about the region
or to the obscurity of international law concerning domestic environmental
damage. 7 This article addresses the legality of the actions against the Marsh
4. The Marsh Arabs of Iraq: Do They Want to Go Back in Time?, ECONOMIST, June
5, 2002, at http://www.economist.com/PrinterFriendly.cfm?StoryID=1827561 (last
visited November 22, 2003) [hereinafter Marsh Arabs].
5. See S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687
(1991); see also S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2951st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/674
(1990); see also S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2978th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/686
(1991).
6. On the damage to Kuwait and the Persian Gulf, see, for example, Margaret T.
Okorodudu-Fubara, Oil in the Persian Gulf: Legal Appraisal of an Environmental Warfare,
23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 123 (1991); Betsy Baker, Legal Protectionsforthe Environment in Times
ofArmed Conflict, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 351 (1993) (see esp. n.5, listing academic conferences
on this topic); Luan Low & David Hodgkinson, Compensationfor Wartime Environmental
Damage: Challenges to InternationalLaw After the Gulf War, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 405 (1995);
Major Walter G. Sharp, Sr., The Effective Deterrence of Environmental Damage During
Armed Conflict: A Case Analysis of the Persian Gulf War, 137 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1992);
Florentino P. Feliciano, Marine Pollution and Spoliation of Natural Resources as War
Measures: A Note on Some InternationalLaw Problems in the Gulf War, 14 Hous. J. INT'L
L. 483 (1992); Philippe Sands, Moderator, The Gulf War: EnvironmentAs a Weapon, 85 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 214 (1991); Marc A. Ross, Comment, Environmental Warfare and the
PersianGulf War: Possible Remedies to CombatIntentionalDestructionof the Environment,
10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 515 (1992); Suzanne M. Bernard, Comment, Environmental Warfare:
Iraq's Use of Oil Weapons During the Gulf Conflict, 6 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 106 (1993); Shilpi
Gupta, Note, Iraq"sEnvironmental Warfare in the PersianGulf,6 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV.

251 (1993); Mark J. T. Caggiano, Comment, The Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction
in Modern Warfare: Customary Substance over ConventionalForm, 20 B.C. ENVM. AFF. L.
REV. 479 (1993); Laura Edgerton, Note, Eco- TerroristActs Duringthe PersianGulf War: Is
InternationalLaw Sufficient to Hold Iraq Liable? 22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 151 (1992);
Stephanie N. Simonds, Note, Conventional Warfare and Environmental Protection: A
Proposalfor InternationalLegal Reform, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 165 (1992); Jesica E. Seacor,
Note and Comment, Environmental Terrorism: Lessonsfrom the Oil Fires of Kuwait, 10 AM.
U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 481 (1994).

7. However, several articles discuss or mention the plight of the Marsh Arabs. See,
e.g., Michael Posner & Fiona McKay, The Iraqi Justice System: Challenges in
Responding to Iraq'sPast Abuses of Human Rights, 42 JUDGES J. 14, 15 (2003); Suzette
Brooks Masters, Environmentally Induced Migration: Beyond a Culture of Reaction, 14
GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 855, 867-68 (2000); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Two Rivers and the
Lands Between: Mesopotamia and the InternationalLaw of Transboundary Waters, 10
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Arabs and the wetlands in which they lived.

II.

THE MARSH ARABS

Before the first Gulf War, Southern Mesopotamia held southwestern
Asia's most extensive wetlands, at the confluence of the Tigris and the
Euphrates.8 For thousands of years these wetlands, spreading out on all
sides of the Tigris, the Euphrates, and the Shatt al-Arab, had been occupied
by the ancestors of the people known today as the Marsh Arabs, whose
culture was uniquely adapted to the marsh environment. 9 The culture of the
Marsh Arabs, existing in harmony with the marsh environment, was
completely dependent on marsh resources: the plants, animals and water of
the marshes. The duration of the culture testifies to the sustainability of its
uses of those resources. The reeds that grew in the marshes were the
primary building material for houses and boats; the fish and waterfowl of
the marshes were a primary source of food.' The marshes themselves
were known to outsiders for their spectacular displays of spring
wildflowers. 1
In recent times, the Marsh Arabs, like a majority of Iraqis, have been
Shi'a Muslims. In 1991, after the first Gulf War, the Marsh Arabs and other
Shiites in southern Iraq rose up in an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow or
at least throw off the control of the Hussein government. 12 The government
responded with a nationwide propaganda campaign labeling the Marsh
Arabs as "monkey-faced" outsiders, 13 followed by an attack on the
environment that sustained Marsh Arab society. Over the next few years,
the government built a system of dams, dikes and canals to drain the
14
wetlands, so that today only seven percent of the original area remains.
Today the Mesopotamian wetlands are parched earth crusted with salt; the

B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 213, 219-20, 224 (1996).
8. See, e.g., Colin Freeman, Marsh Arabs Reclaim Paradise, IRAQ OCCUPATION
WATCH, August 16, 2003, at http://www.occupationwatch.org/article.php?id=493 (last
visited 10/17/2003). The frequent references to "Eden" and "Paradise" in discussions of
the Marsh Arabs reflect the belief that the Garden of Eden was located in the region.
9. See id.; see also Spoils of War, supra note 1; Marsh Arabs, supra note 4.
10. See Wilfred Thesiger, Marsh Dwellers of Southern Iraq: Primitive Ma'dan,
Building Cathedral-like Houses of Reeds, Share a Watery Domain with Buffaloes and
Wild Boars, 108 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 205 (1958).
11. Id. at 205, 232.
12. See, e.g., Marsh Arabs, supra note 4.
13. JOHN FAWCETT & VICTOR TANNER, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, SAIS PROJECT
DISPLACEMENT, THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE OF IRAQ 29 (2002).
INTERNAL
ON
14. Marsh Arabs, supra note 4.
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reeds are gone, and along with them the smooth-coated otter, the crested
porcupine, the grey wolf, the Basrah reed warbler, important staging areas
for migrating waterfowl, countless fish and invertebrates, and a crucial food
supply for the fish of the Persian Gulf.' 5 While the exact number of deaths
and of persons displaced as a result will probably never be known, most
sources estimate the number of displaced persons to be between 200,000
and 400,000.16 A similar17 number may remain in the former marshes in a
state of extreme poverty.

III.

THE LEGALITY OF IRAQ'S ACTIONS UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW
At the time of its campaign against the Marsh Arabs, the
government of Iraq was party to a number of international conventions
bearing on its conduct. In addition, the government was subject to
obligations under customary international law. This section will examine
which obligations under those treaties or under customary international
law were violated by Iraq's conduct.
A.

Sources of InternationalLaw

Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
provides a traditional starting point for examining the sources of
international law:
international conventions,... international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law,.., the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations ....judicial decisions, and the
teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
18
nations.

15. See AMAR International Charitable Foundation, The Marsh Arabs and the
Marshlands,at http://www.amarappeal.com/about5.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
16. See, e.g., MarshArabs, supra note 4; Freeman, supra note 8. See generally THE
IRAQI MARSHLANDS: A HUMAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY (Emma Nicholson & Peter
Clark eds., 2002) (giving a detailed description of the environmental campaign against
the Marsh Arabs) [hereinafter THE IRAQI MARSHLANDS]; see also FAWCETT & TANNER,
supra note 13, at 29-32, 40, 51, 54.
17. The Baroness Emma Nicholson of Winterbourne, The Iraq Marshlands: Can
They be Saved?, Address at Brookings Forum Sponsored by the British Embassy and the
Brookings-SAIS
Project on Internal
Displacement
(May
7, 2003), at
http://www.brook.edu/comn/events/ 20030507marsh.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2003).
18. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055,
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These sources can, with the exception of international conventions, be
grouped together under the heading of "customary international law." 19
1. ConventionalInternationalLaw: Treaties and Other
InternationalAgreements
The environment has always suffered in warfare, but until the latter
part of the twentieth century conventional international law had not
addressed the problem directly. Environmental protection, where it existed
at all, was contained in treaties dealing with other topics. The past century
has brought about a dramatic increase in the destructive power available to
warring states and factions, and a growing worldwide awareness of the
fragility of the natural environment. Weapons now exist, and are available
to many countries, that could render the planet unsuitable for human life.20
This increase in the environmental threat posed by warfare has
brought about a corresponding increase in the attention given to the
The watershed event in the
problem in international agreements.
development of law regarding the protection of the environment during
wartime was the American defoliation campaign during the Vietnam War,
which brought an unprecedented degree of international attention to the
problem of environmental destruction during wartime.2

Prior to that time

environmental protection had been incidental to other international
agreements regulating the conduct of war, rather than a specific end in
itself. Pre-Vietnam era treaties did not deal specifically with the problem of
environmental protection during wartime, but provided some protection
directly. Treaties of this nature to which Iraq is a party include the
Convention Against Genocide, 22 the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol,2 3 and the

1060,3 Bevans 1153, 1187.
19. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
20. The supposed existence of such weapons in Iraq was offered by the
governments of the United Kingdom and the United States as a justification for war with
Iraq, ultimately resulting in considerable embarrassment for both governments.
21. See, e.g., Neil A.F. Popovic, Humanitarian Law, Protection of the Environment,
and Human Rights, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 69-70 (1995); Michael N. Schmitt,
Green War: An Assessment of the Environmental Law of InternationalArmed Conflict,
22 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 9-10 (1997); Aaron Schwabach, EnvironmentalDamage Resulting
from the NATO Military Action Against Yugoslavia, 25 COLUM. J.ENVTL. L. 117, 126
(2000); Ensign Florencio J. Yuzon, DeliberateEnvironmental Modification Through the
Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons: "Greening" the InternationalLaws of Armed
Conflict to Establish an Environmentally Protective Regime, 11 AM. U. J.INT'L L. &
POL'Y 793, 795-96 (1996).
22. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
23. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other
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four Geneva Conventions of 1949. 24 Two agreements from the Vietnam
War era that deal tangentially with environmental issues in a human rights
context are the covenants on Economic and Cultural Rights 25 and on Civil

and Political Rights.26
Between the Vietnam War and the first Gulf War, that portion of the
jus in bello 27 dealing with environmental protection evolved significantly.

A few post-Vietnam era treaties deal specifically with environmental
damage during wartime and may have some relevance to the question of the
legality of Iraq's conduct. Iraq is not a party to these agreements, but some
of their provisions may have entered into customary international law.
These include the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD), 28
Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions
of 1949, 29 and the Rome
30
Court.
Criminal
International
the
of
Statute
2. Note on Customary InternationalLaw
Before discussing the treaties, it is necessary to take a preliminary look
at customary international law. General rules of customary international
Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S.
No. 8061.
24. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 11]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention Iii]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12,1949,6 U.S.T. 3516,75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
25. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3.
26. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 6 I.L.M. 386.
27. Thejus in bello is the body of international law pertaining to the conduct of war.
28. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques, Dec. 10, 1976, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151
[hereinafter ENMOD].
29. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. [hereinafter Protocol 11]. Neither the United States nor
Iraq is a party to either protocol, but portions of both may have become customary
international law.
30. Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A!CONF. 183/9
(1998).
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environmental and humanitarian law may bear on the lawfulness, or lack
thereof, of Iraq's actions. In addition, provisions of some treaties to which
Iraq is not a party may have entered into customary international law, and
thus Iraq may have been bound by those provisions even if it was'not a
party to the treaty.
Customary international law is generally described as the practice of
states undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris. Of the
sources of law mentioned in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, 31 all but the first could conceivably fall within the category
of customary international law, although "general principles of law" have
traditionally been seen as a third category of public international law.
However, they can also be seen as "supplemental rules" or a "secondary
source of law." 3 2 Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most qualified
publicists are merely a "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law."33 In any event, judicial decisions and, to the extent that a state
actually observes them, general principles of law are state practice
undertaken from a sense of legal obligation, and thus form the basis for
normative expectations.
B. The Obligations of lraq
Under Conventional InternationalLaw
1. The Genocide Convention
The attack on the southern Mesopotamian wetlands was probably the
largest attack on the environment itself since Operation Ranch Hand, the
American defoliation campaign in Vietnam, thirty years earlier. As in
Vietnam, the environmental damage was not incidental; the purpose in both
cases was to affect a significant change in the natural environment. But
while the American campaign was intended to facilitate military
maneuvers, the draining of the Iraqi wetlands was a deliberate effort to
eradicate the Marsh Arabs and their culture by altering the environment
upon which they and their culture depended.
Article IV of the Genocide Convention forbids any party from

3 1. These are "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law,.., the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,. . .judicial decisions,
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations." See Statute
of the International Court of Justice, supranote 17.
32. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(4) cmt. I & Reporter's Note 7 (1987).
33. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 17.
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"deliberately inflicting on [a] group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part., 34 The destruction of
the Marsh Arabs' homeland was within the scope of the Convention, at
the time when Iraq had agreed to be bound by its terms. 35 It is still
possible that some of the persons responsible for designing and
implementing the policy may be brought to trial under Article VI of the
Convention. However, no steps have yet been taken either to try those
responsible in the Iraqi court system or to set up a special tribunal for
crimes committed by Iraqi officials in violation of international law. The
official Iraqi response to allegations of genocide against the Marsh Arabs
was cynical: the Parliamentary Speaker noted, "America wiped36the Red
Indians off the face of the earth and nobody raised an eyebrow.
2, The Hague and Geneva Regimes
For decades prior to the Vietnam War, principles of international
law had been in place that should have prevented Operation Ranch Hand.
The 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg stated, "the only legitimate object
which states should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the
military forces of the enemy. 3 7 The objective of Operation Ranch Hand
was, in fact, to weaken the forces of the enemy by denying them forest
cover. However, an additional restriction is imposed by the 1899 and

34. Genocide Convention, supra note 22, at 280. Iraq acceded to the Convention on
Jan. 20, 1959; the United States became a party by ratification on November 25, 1988,
forty years after signing the Convention.
See Genocide Convention, Status of
Ratifications,
Reservations
and
Declarations,
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treatylgen.htm (last visited August 20, 2003)
[hereinafter Status of Ratifications].
35. The United States' ratification includes two reservations and five
understandings. Understanding 4 addresses situations of this sort: "[A]cts in the course
of armed conflicts committed without the specific intent required by article II are not
sufficient to constitute genocide as defined by this Convention." Status of Ratifications,
supra note 33. Iraq's accession to the Convention contains no such provision.
36. FAWCETT & TANNER, supra note 13, at 32 (quoting a 1992 statement of then
Parliamentary Speaker Saadi Mehdi Saleh). It's hard to know just where to begin taking
issue with this remark, but the comparison is apt, if hardly admirable. During the wars
between the United States government and the Plains Indians in the nineteenth century,
government agents engaged in the systematic extermination of buffalo, or American
bison, in a largely successful effort to eradicate the Plains Indians.
37. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight. Saint Petersburg, Nov. 29/Dec. 11 1868, 138 Consol. T.S.
297, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS,
RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 102-03 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds.,
1988). The odd date (Nov. 29/Dec. 11) is the result of a difference in the Russian and
Gregorian calendars that persisted until the time of the Revolution.
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1907 Hague Conventions, which provided that "the right of belligerents
to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. 38 Article 23 of
the 1907 Hague Convention prohibited the use of "poison or poisoned
weapons, 39 although this protection was probably not intended to apply
to poisons used against plants rather than people.
The Operation Ranch Hand/ENMOD pattern of a violation of the
weak general prohibition in Article 23 followed by a post-war response
creating a strong, specific prohibition mirrored that taken to the use of
poison gas. The general provision in Article 23 was ignored by several
of the warring parties in World War I; post-war reaction led to the more
effective 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. 40 In the seventy-eight years since
the adoption of the Protocol, poison gas has rarely been used, 4 ' and its
use has almost always been condemned as a violation of international
law.42
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949, 43 embodying the new
awareness of human rights that followed World War II, also contained
early glimmerings of modem concepts of environmental protection
during wartime. The Conventions prohibit the extensive destruction of
property, when carried out unlawfully and wantonly and not justified by
military necessity.4 4 They also prohibit willfully causing great suffering
or injury to health.45 Environmental damage within a populated territory

38. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter "1907 Hague Convention"]. The Convention
was the fourth of thirteen to emerge from the 1907 Hague Peace Conference and is thus
known as "Hague IV."
39. Id. art. 23.
40. Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous,
or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, supra note 22.
41. One of the rare violators has been Iraq, which is believed to have used poison
gas in its war with Iran and against its rebellious Kurdish population, although the latter
use was internal and thus possibly outside the scope of the 1925 Protocol. Some writers
are of the opinion that Iraq's release and burning of oil violated the 1925 Protocol. See, e.g.,
Okorodudu-Fubara, supranote 6, at 190-91.
42. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 134, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 98, U.N. Doe.
A/RES/46/134 (1992). (Condemning Iraq for its use of chemical weapons against Iraq's
Kurdish population.)
43. Geneva Convention I, supra note 23, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 23,
art. 51; Geneva Convention III, supra note 23, art. 130; Geneva Convention IV, supra note
23, art. 147.
44. Geneva Convention 1,supranote 23, art. 50; Geneva Convention 1I,supra note 23,
art. 51; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 23, art. 147.
45. Geneva Convention 1,supranote 23, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 23,
art. 51; Geneva Convention I1l, supra note 23, art. 130; Geneva Convention IV, supra note
23, art. 147.
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typically involves damage to property as well as a risk of suffering or
injury to the inhabitants; thus environmental damage such as that caused
by the American campaign in Vietnam or the Iraqi campaign against the
Marsh Arabs would be included if the harm was inflicted willfully.
3. Common Article 3
At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference at which the four Geneva
Conventions 46 were adopted, there was considerable debate between
those parties that wished the protections in the Conventions to apply to
all armed conflicts, and those that wished it to apply only to conflicts
between states.47 The result was Common Article 3, included in all four
conventions. The portion of Common Article 3 that may have some
bearing on the situation of the Marsh Arabs provides that:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each
Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the
following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms
and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds,
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded
on race, colour, religion 48or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or
any other similar criteria.
An unknown number of Marsh Arabs were killed outright by Iraqi
forces during the drainage operations, and far more were deprived of
their homes and livelihoods. 49 At this time, the "hostilities" were largely
over, and most or all of those killed or otherwise treated inhumanely
would have been taking no active part. And depriving people of their
homes and livelihoods can hardly be considered humane treatment. But
the protections in Common Article 3 are considerably less extensive than
those contained in the remainder of the four Conventions and applicable
to international armed conflicts, and more or less co-extensive with the

46. Geneva Conventions I, II, III, and IV, supranote 23.
47. See Charles Lysaght, The Scope of Protocol H and Its Relation to Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Other Human Rights Instruments, 33
AMERICAN

U. L. REv. 9, 12 (1983).

48. Geneva Convention 1,supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva Convention II, supra note 23,
art. 3; Geneva Convention III, supra note 23, art. 3; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 23,
art. 3.
49. See FAWCETT & TANNER, supra note 13, at 31.
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protections contained in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.5 °
While they may address some deprivations of individual rights during the
drainage campaign, they do not address the larger issue of the underlying
illegality of the campaign itself.
4. The Human Rights Covenants
The relevant portions of the International Covenant on Economic
and Cultural Rights 51 and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights 52 are identical. Article 1(2) of each convention provides
that:
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out
of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of
mutual benefit, and international law. In53no case may a people be
deprived of its own means of subsistence.
Article 25 of the Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights and Article
47 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are also identical:
"Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the
inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their
natural wealth and resources. "514
These provisions illustrate the insoluble problems inherent in the
idea of collective rights: What is a "people"? Are the Iraqis a "people"?
If so, may they not exploit the waters of the Tigris, the Euphrates and the
Shatt al-Arab as they see fit, even to the detriment of some subset of the
Iraqi people? Are the Marsh Arabs a "people"? What if some Marsh
Arabs actually believe the wetlands should be drained, or benefit from it?
Who speaks for the Iraqi "people" or the Marsh Arab "people"? If the
Marsh Arabs are not part of the Iraqi "people," then by extension the
Kurds, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Turkomans, minority Sunni Arabs, and
fragmented and disempowered Shiite Arabs, among others, are not part
of the Iraqi "people," either; any multicultural state such as Iraq must

50. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 26, at arts.
4(2), 6, 7 & 10.
51. International Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights, supra note 25.
52. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 26. The Covenant
also contains guarantees of rights identical or analogous to those in Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions. See id.
53. International Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights, supra note 25, art. 1(2);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supranote 26, art. 1(2).
54. Id. art. 25; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 26, art.
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lack a cultural identity as a "people."
Collective or third-generation rights are most often discussed in
relation to the rights of indigenous or minority "peoples," such as the
Marsh Arabs. But the right to sovereignty over natural resources is
generally discussed in relation to the rights of states and national
populations, such as Iraq and the Iraqis. Customary international law
probably recognizes no collective rights other than the right to existence
(addressed by the Genocide Convention 55) and the right to selfdetermination,56 both of which were violated by the Hussein
government's actions. Debating these issues may provide hours of
entertainment for academics, 57 but as a practical matter, it means that the
environmental provisions of these two covenants are too ambiguous to
provide useful guidance. If the Marsh Arabs are a "people" within the
meaning of the natural resource provisions of the Conventions, however,
they have certainly been deprived of their means of subsistence in
violation of the Conventions.
5. Environmental Treaties
Iraq is a party to fifty treaties with environmental provisions. 58 Of
55. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Feisal Hussain Naqvi, People's Rights or Victim's Rights:
Reexamining the Conceptualization of Indigenous Rights in InternationalLaw, 71 IND. L.
J. 673, 724 (1996).
57. For some thoughtful discussions of these issues, see, for example, PETER R.
BAEHR, HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALITY IN PRACTICE (1999); Maila Stivens, Introduction:
Gender Politics and the Reimagining of Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND GENDER POLITICS: ASIA- PACIFIC PERSPECTIVES 17 (Anne-Marie Hilsdon et

al. eds., 2000); Penelope E. Andrews, Globalization, Human Rights and CriticalRace
Feminism: Voices from the Margins, 3 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 373 (2000); Mahmood
Monshipouri, Promoting Universal Human Rights: Dilemmas of Integrating Developing
Countries, 4 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 25 (2001); Yash Ghai, Universalism and
Relativism: Human Rights as a Framework for Negotiating Interethnic Claims, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 1095 (2000); Li-ann Thio, Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN
Countries: 'Promisesto Keep and Miles to go Before I Sleep,'2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV.
L.J 1 (1999); Prudence E. Taylor, From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A
New Dynamic in InternationalLaw?, 10 GEORGETOWN INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 309 (1998);
Eric J. Mitnick, Taking Rights Spherically: Formal and Collective Aspects of Legal
Rights, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 409 (1999).
58. ENTRI: Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators, Iraq Country
Summary, http://sedae.ciesin.columbia.edu:9080/entrilcountryProfile.jsp (last visited Oct.
9, 2003) (on file with CJIELP). Iraq has also signed but not ratified two environmental
treaties, one of which is ENMOD. ENMOD, supra note 28. Iraq has also, along with 80
other former members out of a total of 95, denounced one treaty. International
Convention
for the
Safety
of Life
at Sea,
June
17,
1960,
at
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu:9080/entri/texts/acrc/solas60.txt.html (last visited Oct. 9,

2004]

Ecocide and Genocide in Iraq

these, there are a few that merit at least cursory examination in a
discussion of the Marsh Arabs and the southern Mesopotamian
wetlands: 59 the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage; 60 the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea; 61 the International Plant Protection Convention; 62 the
International Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights; 63 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 64 the Kuwait
Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Pollution; 65 and the Protocol for the Protection66 of the
Marine Environment against Pollution from Land-Based Sources.
Two of these can be dismissed fairly quickly.
First, the
International Plant Protection Convention is aimed at preventing the
spread of plant diseases and protecting cultivated plants, not at protecting
wild vegetation and plant habitat.67 Second, although the destruction of
the wetlands is certain to cause an increase in marine pollution in the
northern Persian Gulf, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea does not address shore-based coastal marine pollution. Pollution of
this sort is addressed by the Convention for the Prevention of Marine
Pollution from Land-Based Sources, 68 to which Iraq is not a party, and
by the Kuwait Convention 69 and its Protocol on Pollution from Land-

2003) (on file with Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy).
59. Iraq is not a party to the Ramsar Wetlands Convention. Convention on
Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, 996
U.N.T.S. 245, reprintedin 11 I.L.M. 963 (1972).
60. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
Nov. 16, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151. [hereinafter World Heritage
Convention].
61. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397,21 I.L.M. 1261.
62. International Plant Protection Convention, Dec. 6, 1951, Art. 11(3), 23 U.S.T.
2767, 150 U.N.T.S. 67 (revised Nov. 28, 1979).
63. International Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights, supra note 25.
64. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 26.
65. Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Pollution, Apr. 24, 1978, 1140 U.N.T.S. 133, 17 I.L.M. 511 (1978)
[hereinafter Kuwait Convention].
66. Protocol for the Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from LandBased Sources, Feb. 21, 1990, (entered into force 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Protocol to Kuwait Convention].
67. International Plant Protection Convention, supra note 62, art. 11(3).
68. Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources,
June 14, 1974, U.K.T.S. 64 (1978), Cmnd. 7251, 13 I.L.M. 352.
69. Kuwait Convention, supra note 65.
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70

Based Sources.
A third international instrument, the Convention Concerning the
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 71 allows the
designation of certain sites of cultural significance, natural significance,
or both as World Heritage Sites, and sets up a fund to provide assistance
in preserving these sites. The lower Mesopotamian wetlands are not
designated as a World Heritage Site. 72 A designated site in Iraq, Ashur,
is threatened by a proposed dam and has been added to UNESCO's list
of World Heritage Sites in Danger.73 Iraq's overall program of hydraulic
and hydrologic engineering, which threatens Ashur, has also destroyed
the southern Mesopotamian wetlands. However, even an expanded view
does not mean that Iraq has violated or is likely to violate any obligations
under the Convention.
The Convention imposes specific responsibilities on states with
regard to natural or cultural heritage located in the territory of other
states: "Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to take any
deliberate measures which might damage directly or indirectly the
cultural and natural heritage... Situated on the territory of other States
Parties to this Convention." 74 In contrast, with regard to cultural and
natural heritage in their own territory, states are subject to a somewhat
more vague exhortation to "ensur[e] the identification, protection,
of the
conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations
75
cultural and natural heritage.. .situated on its territory."
The Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the
Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution provides that "The
Contracting States shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, abate
and combat pollution caused by discharges from land reaching the Sea
Area whether water-borne, air-borne or directly from the coast including
outfalls and pipelines. ''76 While this at first seems more likely to be
relevant to the situation of the Marsh Arabs and the southern
Mesopotamian marshes, in fact it imposes little actual responsibility on
70. Protocol to the Kuwait Convention, supra note 66.
71. World Heritage Convention, supranote 60.
72. UNESCO, WORLD HERITAGE LIST, at http://whc.unesco.org/heritage.htm (last
visited August 23, 2003). Somewhat surprisingly, considering Iraq's wealth of
archaeological sites, only two World Heritage Sites are listed for Iraq. Id.
73. UNESCO, As-ItR, at http://whc.unesco.org/sites/I130.htm (last visited August
23, 2003) (describing Ashur); UNESCO, WORLD HERITAGE LIST IN DANGER, at
http://whc.unesco.org/toc/mainf4.htm (last visited August 23, 2003) (listing the world
heritage sites in danger).
74. World Heritage Convention, supra note 60, art. 6(3).
75. Id. art. 4.
76. Kuwait Convention, supranote 65, art. VI.
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measures,"
Iraq. The Convention requires Iraq to take "all appropriate
77
not "all possible measures" or "all necessary measures."
The 1990 Protocol for the Protection of the Marine Environment
against Pollution from Land-Based Sources 78 adds a requirement of
environmental impact assessment for activities likely to cause pollution
below the saltwater line 79 and requires cooperation between states in the
event of pollution from a transboundary watercourse such as the lower
Mesopotamian wetlands and the Shatt al-Arab.8 ° It also provides that
"[c]ontracting States shall ensure that recourse is available in accordance
with their legal systems for prompt and adequate compensation or other
relief in respect of damage caused by pollution of the Marine
Environment by natural or juridical persons under their jurisdiction. 81
The damage to the wetlands may itself be a polluting activity,
leading to a short-term increase in the amount of organic matter
discharged into the Persian Gulf with consequent eutrophication. The
loss of the filtering capacity of the wetlands will also lead to an increase
in the quantity of pollutants from other sources ultimately reaching the
gulf. But although the Kuwait Convention and its Protocol may provide
some recourse for Iraq's neighbors injured by increased marine pollution,
they provide none for the Marsh Arabs. The suffering of the Marsh
Arabs is the result of the destruction of the marshes, not the result of any
consequent pollution of the marine environment.
C. The Obligations of Iraq Under Customary InternationalLaw
There are also some general principles of customary international law
that may be applicable to the destruction of the southern Mesopotamian
wetlands. Most customary law deals entirely with relations between states,
however. While it might provide a remedy to Iran for damage to its portion
of the wetlands, it offers none to the Iraqi Marsh Arabs. Customary law
might, however, provide guidance in defining terms such as "military
necessity" that could aid in application of conventional law.
The Martens Clause of the 1907 Hague Convention incorporates
customary international law to fill any lacunae in the treaty regime
77. For a discussion of the significance of these and related differences in wording,
see, for example, Aaron Schwabach, The United Nations Convention on the Law of NonNavigational Uses of InternationalWatercourses, Customary InternationalLaw, and the
Interests of Developing Upper Riparians,33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 257, 272-73 (1998).
78. Protocol to the Kuwait Convention, supra note 66.
79. Id. art. VIII(l).
80. Id. art. XI(1).
81. Id. art. XIII(1).
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governing state conduct during wartime:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued... the
inhabitants and belligerents remain under the protection and the rule
of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, 82from the laws of humanity, and
the dictates of the public conscience.
Thus treaties may derogate from customary international law, but in the
absence of such provisions the rules of customary international law are
binding on the parties to the Hague Convention. Note also that the
Convention itself has attained, through widespread observance or at least
aspiration, the status of customary international law. A certain amount of
bootstrapping thus results in a universal body of customary international
law on the topic, equally binding on all nations.
1. Customary InternationalEnvironmentalLaw
Customary international law deals with transboundary rather than
domestic environmental harm.83 The fundamental principle in this area of
law is that each state has a duty not to allow its territory to be used so as to
injure that of another.84 Principle 21 of the United Nations' Stockholm
Declaration on the Human Environment, an aspirational document now
widely accepted as a statement of customary international law, provides
that states have the "sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant
to their own environmental policies.' 85 Along with this right, however,
comes the "responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 8 6 The United States and others,

82. 1907 Hague Convention, supranote 38, at pmbl.
83. For a fuller exposition of the problems in some of these areas, see for example,
Aaron Schwabach, Diverting the Danube: The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dispute and
InternationalFreshwaterLaw, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 290, 323-40 (1996).
84. See, e.g., Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1941),
reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941); C. Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4,
22 (1949) (determination on the merits); Affaire du Lac Lanoux (Spain v. Fr.),
12 R.I.A.A. (1957), digested in 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 156 (1959).
85. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, at Prin. 21,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/ Rev.I (1972); see also World Charter for Nature, Oct. 28, 1982,
G.A. Res. 37/7 (Annex), U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/37/7, 22
I.L.M. 455 (1983); Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 14, 1992,
U.N.Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. 1), 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
86. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, supra note
84; see also World Charter for Nature, supra note 84; Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, supra note 84.
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however, hold the view that Principle 21 is not applicable to wartime
environmental damage.87
There is considerably less evidence of international custom when the
destruction takes place within a single country. Principle 21 would seem to
excuse such destruction as an exercise of the sovereign right to exploit
resources. If, however, the Marsh Arabs are a different "people" from the
other Iraqis, their situation may be analogous to that of an occupied
territory. During World War II, for example, German civilian officials in
occupied Poland were charged with "ruthless exploitation of Polish
forestry" including "the wholesale cutting of Polish timber to an extent far
in excess of what was necessary to preserve the timber resources of the
The Committee of the United Nations War Crimes
country. ,,8
Commission found that prima facie existence of a war crime had been
89
shown and nine of the officials were listed as accused war criminals.
Germany, however, had invaded Poland and was an occupying foreign
power at the time. It may not be possible to stretch the definition of
"occupied territory" to cover the homeland of the Marsh Arabs.
2. Customary InternationalLaw Regarding "MilitaryNecessity"
Customary international law on transboundary environmental harm
recognizes an exception for military necessity. Excessive environmental
damage may be excused if it reasonably appeared necessary to the decisionmaker at the time the action was undertaken. 90 The German officials who
looted Poland's forest did not have any immediate military necessity for
doing so; neither did the Iraqi government that drained the northern
marshes.
The use of the military necessity exception is limited by the principles
of proportionality, humanity, discrimination, and chivalry. 91 Humanity
requires that military forces avoid inflicting suffering, injury, or destruction
beyond that actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate

87. See Low & Hodgkinson, supra note 6, at 445.
88. United Nations War Crimes Commission, Case No. 7150 496 (1948).
89. U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 496 (1948).
90. See, e.g., United States v. List, XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRiBUNALS 1296 (1947-48). See also generally W. Hays Parks, Air
War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990). Note that while this "reasonable
commander" standard may provide protection for individual military officers in war crimes
trials, it is not necessarily a defense to state liability.
91. See, e.g., INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S
SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, JA 442, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, at 18-1, 18-2 (1996).
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military objectives,92 and discrimination requires that attackers distinguish
military targets from civilian ones. 93 The principle of chivalry relates to the
use of subterfuge and is not likely to arise in an environmental context.
The principle of proportionality, on the other hand, is always at issue
when questions of military necessity for inflicting environmental damage
arise. Proportionality requires that the force used be proportional to the
desired objective.94 For example, the 1938 destruction of the Huayuankow
Dike by Nationalist forces during the Japanese invasion of China was
disproportionate: the subsequent flooding killed several thousand Japanese
soldiers and succeeded in halting the Japanese advance in the region, but it
also killed hundreds of thousands of Chinese civilians-probably the
greatest loss of life ever caused by a single human action-and caused
untold economic damage. 95 The destruction of the dike also violated the
principles of humanity and discrimination.
The Iraqi actions also seem to have violated all three principles. The
destruction of the wetlands was disproportionate to the goal of eliminating a
handful of impoverished and already defeated rebels. Enormous suffering,
injury and destruction were inflicted on the Marsh Arab population as a
whole; the military goal of capturing the last few rebels could have been
achieved with considerably less destruction. And although the vast
majority of Marsh Arabs, and even the majority of villages, must have been
uninvolved in the rebellion, there was no apparent attempt made to
distinguish between civilian and rebel individuals or villages. Therefore,
the military necessity exception seems not to apply.
D. Conventions Pertainingto the Conduct of War with
Specifically EnvironmentalProvisions to Which Iraq is Not a
Party
1. ENMOD
The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) 96 was intended
to prohibit the hostile use of large-scale environmental modification such as
the deforestation practiced by the United States in Vietnam, as well as
possible new forms of environmental modification including weather
92. See, e.g., Yuzon, supranote 21, at 812.
93.,.See, e.g, id. at 810-11.
94. See, eg., id. at 810.
95. See, e.g., Caggiano, supra note 6, at n. 73.
96. ENMOD, supranote 28.

20041

Ecocide and Genocide in Iraq

control and deliberate destruction of the ozone layer. 97 ENMOD requires
that the effect on the environment, in order to fall under the treaty, be
"widespread, long-lasting, or severe." 98 Understanding I of the Conference
of the Committee on Disarmament defines the terms as follows:
"widespread" means extending over "several hundred square kilometers";
"long-lasting" means "approximately a season"; "severe" means causing
"serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and
economic resources or other assets." 99 Note that ENMOD does not require
that the disruption be widespread, long lasting, and severe; any one of the
three is sufficient to constitute a violation.
The damage to the Mesopotamian wetlands meets all of these
requirements. The marshes, which had covered an area of nearly 11,000
square kilometers in 1970, had shrunk to 1,084 square kilometers by 2000
and 759 by 2002.100 The damage has lasted for many seasons and may be
permanent, although plans for restoration have been proposed.'°1 And there
has been serious disruption to human life and natural and economic
resources: hundreds of thousands of people have been forced to leave their
homes and live as impoverished refugees either within Iraq or across the
border in Iran. There has also been widespread loss of animal and plant
life, with disruption to fisheries and water supplies. 102
However, Iraq is not a party to ENMOD; it signed the treaty in 1977,
but has not ratified it or deposited instruments of accession. 0 3 It is thus not
bound by the treaty unless ENMOD's provisions have attained the status of
customary international law through widespread observation in the practice
of states out of a sense of legal obligation. The expanded definitions in
97. See Schmitt, supra note 21, at 82-85. (providing a much more complete discussion
of ENMOD)
98. ENMOD, supranote 28, art. I(1).
99. Yuzon, supranote 21, at 806 (citing Understandings I & HIof the Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR 377-78 (Adam

Roberts & Richard Guelffeds., 2d ed. 1989)).
100. UNEP, "Jardinde l'Eden" au sud de l'Irak risque de disparaitred'ici 5 ans,
at
available
2003,
22,
Mar.
http://www.grid.unep.ch/activities/sustainable/tigris/marshlands/index.fr.php (last visited
August 22, 2003).
101. For example, an Iraqi expatriate group, the Iraq Foundation, seeks U.S.
government funding for its plans to restore the marshes. See, e.g., Bayan Rahman and
Frances Williams, Environmentalists Head to Rescue of Marshes, Financial Times, Apr.
12, 2003, at 5.
102. See generally, e.g., AMAR International Charitable Foundation, supra note 15;
Marsh Arabs, supra note 4; Freeman, supra note 8; THE IRAQI MARSHLANDS, supra note
16; FAWCETT & TANNER, supra note 13.
103. See, e.g., ENMOD, PARTIES AND SIGNATORIES (2001) at http://www.sunshineproject.org/enmod/parties.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2003).
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Understanding I of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, at
least, have not attained that status; many of the parties to ENMOD, in fact,
have dissented from them. 10 4 Thus, Understanding I does not represent a
consensus even among the parties as to the meaning of these terms.
The language in the treaty itself prohibiting military use of
"widespread, long-lasting, or severe" environmental modification may have
become customary international law and may therefore be binding on Iraq,
unless Iraq has consistently dissented. Warring states, even those not
10 5
bound by ENMOD, have for the most part refrained from such acts.
When they have not refrained (as Saddam Hussein's Iraq did not), the
action has generally been met with universal disapproval. Thus, there
seems to exist an international sense of legal obligation to refrain from
strategic or tactical use of widespread, long-lasting, or severe environmental
modification. However, ENMOD confines itself to prohibiting the use of
such techniques by one state against another state: a purely internal conflict
outside the scope of any
is outside the scope of the treaty and thus
06
customary legal principles arising therefrom.1
2. ProtocolI
Protocol I was drafted by the International Committee of the Red
Cross between 1974 and 1977; Iraq is not a party. 10 7 The United States,
which signed the Protocol in 1978 but has not yet ratified it, takes the
10 8
position that much of Protocol I is customary law and thus binding.
For the most part this seems to be borne out in the practice of states.
In the post-World War II world, conflicts within states have been far
more common than conflicts between states, although the line is often
very difficult to draw. The dispute over how to treat internal armed
conflicts, which had led to the adoption of Common Article 3 in the four
1949 Geneva Conventions, arose again in the negotiations leading to the

104. Yuzon, supra note 21, at 807.
105. The United States, incidentally, is a party to ENMOD. ENMOD, supra note
27.
106. Id. art. I(1).
107. See INTERNATIONAL

COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS,

TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF

12

AUGUST

1949

PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL

AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF

OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL 1) 8 JUNE 1977, at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/919ea1456cfe9058c12563da00617b39/d9e6b6264d7723c3cl
2563cd002d6ce4?OpenDocument (last visited November 22, 2003); INTERNATIONAL
VICTIMS

COMMITTEE

OF

THE

RED

CROSS,

STATES

PARTIES

AND

SIGNATORIES,

http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM?OpenView&Start= - &Count
=150&Expand=52.1 #52.1 (last visited November 22, 2003) [hereinafter STATES
108. See Schmitt, supra note 3, at 69.

at

PARTIES].
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adoption of Protocols I and 1I. Many countries proposed that there
should be little or no difference in the treatment of internal and
international armed conflicts. Norway, for example, successfully urged
the adoption of a provision applying the provisions of the four 1949
Conventions and Protocol I to "armed conflicts in which peoples are
fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against
racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination."10 9
There is considerable ambiguity here: At what point does an armed
conflict become a struggle against colonial domination or alien
occupation? The Marsh Arabs were not subject to colonial domination
or alien occupation in the traditional sense. They do not (or did not)
possess national aspirations and national liberation movements as do, for
example, the Kurds of northern Iraq. A regime that characterized the
Marsh Arabs as "monkey-faced" and "not real Iraqis"' 110 is certainly
discriminatory, but whether it is racist depends on what is meant by
"race" and "racist."
"Racist regimes" was, at the time of its inclusion, a specific
reference to the governments of South Africa and what was then
Rhodesia. The commentary on Protocol I refers to "minority racist
regimes,"'' 11 but also states that the term can refer to "if not the existence
of two completely distinct peoples, at least a rift within a people which
'1 12
ensures hegemony of one section in accordance with racist ideas."
While the Marsh Arabs are not a separate race from the majority of Iraqis
or from the ruling religious minority during the Hussein years, there was
evidently a rift between them and the ruling group, and that group's
hegemony over the Marsh Arabs, if not over the country as a whole,
appeared to be based on racist ideas.
Most of the environmental protection provided by Protocol I is, like
all such protection previously, indirect. Protocol I also contains direct
environmental protections, however. Article 35(1) reiterates the Hague
Convention principle that "[i]n any armed conflict, the right of the
Parties to the Conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not
unlimited[.]"1 13 Article 35(3) makes this provision specifically applicable

109. Protocol I, supra note 29, art. 1(4); Lysaght, supra note 47, at 9-10.
110. See FAWCETT & TANNER, supra note 13, at 29.
111. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOL
ADDITIONAL TO TRE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING TO THE
PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL 1), 8 JUNE 1977,

80, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COMART?.openview
2003) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOL I].
112. Id.art. 1, 112.
113. Protocol 1,
supra note 29, art. 35(1).

(last visited August 24,
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to the environment: "[i]t is prohibited to employ methods or means of
widespread,
warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause
' 14
environment."
natural
the
to
damage
severe
long-term, and
At first glance the wording might appear identical to that of
ENMOD, but the choice of conjunction makes an enormous difference:
ENMOD prohibits techniques having "widespread, long-lasting or
severe" effects,l| 5.while Protocol I aims to prevent "widespread, longterm, and severe" damage.' 16 The Protocol I standard is thus much higher
than the ENMOD standard: all three elements must be met, rather than
merely one. There is no reason to assume that the definitions of
"widespread, long-term, and severe" contained in Understanding I, which
as noted are not customary international law, are applicable to Protocol i.
On the contrary, the commentary to Article 55, which uses the same phrase,
states that "[i]n the final debate several delegations indicated that in their
opinion the words 'widespread, long-term and severe' do not have the
same meaning in the Protocol as the corresponding words in
[ENMOD]."1 7 The United States delegation expressed the opinion that
Article 35 governed a wider scope of activity than ENMOD, as it
covered harm inflicted upon the environment by any means rather than
only the use or modification of the environment itself as a weapon.1 18 By
almost any conceivable measure, however, the damage done to the
homeland of the Marsh Arabs seems likely not only to meet but to exceed
the minimum threshold for all three elements.
Article 54 of Protocol I prohibits attacking, destroying, or rendering
useless "objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,"
including drinking water supplies and installations and agricultural areas
for the production of foodstuffs. 19 While the draining of the wetlands
undoubtedly affected water supplies and production of foodstuffs, the
wetlands and watercourses may not be "objects" within the meaning of
Article 51. The commentary to Article 54 suggests that they may be:
[T]he title of the article, like the text... refers to "objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population," while Article
69... refers to... "supplies essential to the survival of the civilian
population" (while the title uses the term "basic needs"). In the
French text of these two articles the difference in terminology is only
in the adjective: reference is made to "biens indispensables" and
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at art. 35(3).
ENMOD, supranote 27, art. I(1).
Protocol I, supra note 29, art. 35(3)
COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOL I, supra note 111, art. 55, 2136.
Id. at 1450; see generally id. art. 35, 1447-58.
Protocol I, supra note 29, art. 54(2).
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the two terms must
"biens essentiels", respectively. In their contexts
2
be considered to have the same meaning. 0
This is incorrect, however. Article 54 does indeed refer, in the title and in
the text, to "biens indispensables;" the English version uses "objects
indispensable [to the survival of the civilian population].' 12' The title of
Article 69 uses the term "besoins essentiels," however, while the text
refers to "approvisionementsessentiels.'', 22 In the English text of Article
69, the corresponding terms are "basic needs" and "supplies essential [to
the survival of the civilian population].' 23
In addition, the destruction of the wetlands did have "the specific
purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian
population" and did "leave the civilian population with such inadequate
food and water as to cause its starvation or force its movement," as
prohibited by Article 54.124 The destruction was also carried out as a
reprisal, also prohibited: "[t]hese objects shall not be made the object of
reprisals.' 2 5
Article 55 of the Protocol is aimed purely at protection of the
environment and of civilian populations dependent upon it:
Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment
against widespread, long-term, and severe damage. This protection
includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare
which are intended to or may be expected to cause such damage to
the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or
survival of the population.126
In addition, "[a]ttacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals
are prohibited."'' 27 This treaty provision was designed to prohibit exactly
the type of harm that occurred in southern Iraq: retaliation against a civilian
population by damaging the environment upon which that population
depended for its health and survival.
Thus, Iraq would at first appear to be in violation of the terms of
Protocol I. And if, as seems likely, the environmental provisions of

120. COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOL 1, supra note 111, art. 54 2086.
121. Protocol 1,supra note 29, art. 54(2).
122. Protocole additional aux Conventions de Gen~ve du 12 aofit 1949 relatif A la
protection des victims des conflits armrs internationaux, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 271,
arts. 54, 69. (French text of Protocol I).
123. Id. art. 69.
124. Id. art 54(2).
125. Id. art. 54(4).
126. Id. art. 55(1).
127. Id. art. 55(2).

Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y

[Vol. 15:1

Protocol I have become part of customary international law, Iraq would
seem to be in violation of those provisions even though it is not a party to
the Protocol, unless it has been a consistent dissenter.
But if the Marsh Arabs were not struggling against a racist regime in
exercise of their right of self-determination, Protocol I will be inapplicable
because the draining of the wetlands and attacks on the Marsh Arabs
happened largely within the borders of Iraq. While the portion of the
wetlands lying in Iran has also, inevitably, been affected, those effects seem
to have been incidental; the Iraqi wetlands were the primary target. 128 A
separate document, Protocol II, applies to armed conflicts within the
borders of a single state.
3. ProtocolII
Protocol II was adopted to cover non-international conflicts that
were not struggles against colonial domination, alien occupation or racist
regimes. 29 The coverage of Common Article 3, Protocol II and Protocol
I can be thought of as three concentric circles. The outer, largest circle is
Common Article 3; it applies to all non-international armed conflicts.
The middle circle is Protocol II; it applies to non-international armed
conflicts in which the rebels "exercise such control over a part of [the
state's] territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted
military operations and to implement" Protocol 11.130 The inner circle is
Protocol I; it applies only to international conflicts and to conflicts "in
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of selfdetermination[.],, 13 1
Conceivably the inner two circles are not
concentric, but overlapping; there may be anti-colonial rebel groups that
do not exercise control over territory sufficient to allow them to
implement Protocol II, but would nonetheless be covered by Protocol I
and the four 1949 Conventions.
Although the protections of Protocol II are less extensive than those
of Protocol I, Protocol II does contain some measures protecting the
128. This does not mean that Iran has no recourse against Iraq for damage to its
territory; traditional principles of state responsibility would still apply. See infra notes
118-20 and accompanying text.
129. See Protocol 1I, supra note 29, Art. I; See also INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF
THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
OF

12 AUGUST

1949, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL

(PROTOCOL
II), 8 JUNE 1977,
4446-79, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COMART?openview (last visited August 24, 2003).
130. Protocol II, supra note 29, art. I(1).
13 1. Protocol I, supra note 29, art. 1(4).
ARMED
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environment. Article 14 of Protocol 1I is similar to Article 54(1) and (2)
of Protocol 1, but somewhat more narrowly worded. Article 14 provides:
Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is
therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless, for
that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of
drinking water installations and supplies
foodstuffs, crops, livestock,
32
and irrigation works.1

In contrast, Article 54 of Protocol I provides:
33
1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.'

2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as
foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs,
crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and
irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for
their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse
Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out
34
civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.'
The minor textual difference has significant consequences for the Marsh
Arabs. Protocol I, possibly inapplicable to their situation, places the
prohibition of destroying indispensable objects in a separate numbered
paragraph from the prohibition of starvation. That separate paragraph
elaborates further: It is illegal not merely to destroy these objects to
starve the civilian population, but also to destroy them to cause the
civilians to move away or for any other reason.
If Protocol I were applicable to the situation, a violation could be
proved by showing that the marshes were an indispensable object. While
this might be difficult, under Protocol II there is a second hurdle: the
motive of the Hussein government must have been to starve the civilian
population, rather than to injure them in some other way. (Note, though,
that the exceptions in Articles 54(1) and 54(3) of Protocol I do not apply
to Article 14 of Protocol II.) Even more distressing is the absence in
Protocol IL of any specifically environmental provision analogous to
Article 55 of Protocol I. There is, however, a prohibition on the forced
movement of civilians in Article 17 of Protocol LI:
1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered
for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the
132. Protocol 11, supra note 29, art. 14.
133. Protocol 1,supra note 29, art. 54(1).
134. Id. art. 54(2).
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civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand.
Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible
measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may
be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene,
health, safety and nutrition.
2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for
reasons connected with the conflict. 135
This provision seems to have been violated. The Marsh Arabs were
forced to relocate by the destruction of their environment, and in some
cases at gunpoint and by the burning of their villages. This was certainly
not for their security. The conflict had already ended, so there could not
have been any immediate military necessity, although the Hussein
government might have imagined a long-term necessity. "All possible
measures" were not taken to ensure that the Marsh Arabs were "received
under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and
nutrition," as their situation today shows. However, Iraq is not a party to
Protocol I or 11.136 Even if the provisions of the Protocols have, as the
U.S. maintains, entered into customary law, Iraq has in all probability
been a consistent dissenter, preventing the formation of any normative
expectation that Iraq will act in accordance with the Protocols or feels
obligated to do so.
While countries such as Norway may feel that a single standard
should apply to all armed conflicts,' 3 7 a cynic might observe that the
probability that Norway will suffer an internal armed conflict at any time
in the foreseeable future is remote. Countries that are more likely to
experience such conflicts, including Iraq, may have a greater stake in the
formation of rules regarding those conflicts. Nonetheless, it is possible
that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions are jus cogens, a norm
from which Iraq cannot derogate,1 38 although that may not be true of the
139
1977 Protocols.

135. Protocol II, supra note 29, art. 17.
136. See supra note 107 (Iraq not a party to Protocol

1);

STATES PARTIES, supra note

107.
137. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes:
Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81 (2001).
139. See, e.g., HILAIRE McCOtBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 195

(1990). "It might, in the light of the very large number of states party to them, be argued
that the whole of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, although not of the 1977 Additional
Protocols, have been absorbed into the body of jus cogens." Id. This approach to jus
cogens may be somewhat more skeptical than that of many scholars, although a similar or
greater skepticism is expressed by many governments. The debate over the existence,
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4. The Rome Statute
The Rome Statute establishes a permanent International Criminal
Court to adjudicate crimes against humanity. 140 Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the
Rome Statute prohibits:
[i]ntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack
will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects or widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.14
Iraq's attack on the southern Mesopotamian wetlands was launched not
only with the knowledge but also with the intention that it would cause
"widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment."
(Note that the standard is identical to that in Articles 35(3) and 55 of
Protocol I.) 142 It certainly seems excessive in relation to any military
43
advantage obtained. Iraq, however, is not a party to the Rome Statute.

VI. CONCLUSION
The various environmental treaties to which Iraq is a party, and
customary international law regarding transboundary environmental
harm, provide little recourse for the Marsh Arabs, although they may
provide the basis for claims to be pursued by neighboring states.
Conversely, the former Iraqi government is not likely to be exonerated
on grounds of military necessity.
Environmental destruction as a means to achieving military objectives
during wartime seems likely to continue. Even the smallest degree of
military advantage during combat may be worth an enormous amount of
post-war disapproval. In addition, rebel soldiers are not likely to restrain
their actions for military reasons; if they fail to achieve their military
objectives and are defeated by the state against which they are fighting, they
can expect to be imprisoned or executed in any event. A trial for
nature and extent ofjus cogens norms is extensive, and beyond the scope of this paper.
140. Rome Statute, supra note 30; see also UN, ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, at http://www.un.org/law/icc/ (last visited August 23, 2003).
141. Rome Statute, supranote 30, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
142. See supra notes I t3-119 and accompanying text.
143. See Rome Statute, supra note 30; see also UN MULTILATERAL TREATIES
DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
at
(1988),
COURT
CRIMINAL

http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/partI/chapterXVll/treaty I 0.asp
(last visited August 23, 2003).
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environmental war crimes is a remote concern. The lack of any effective
constraint on the rebel side may lead to a lack of restraint on the
government side. Balanced against these considerations is self-interest: the
territory the government is harming in a non-international conflict is,
ultimately, its own territory. In addition to international disapproval, the
offending government will ultimately bear the costs of the damage.
For the Marsh Arabs themselves, the future is uncertain. Restoration
projects, involving removing the dikes and re-flooding the former
marshlands, are being discussed, but such projects will require a great deal
of money that is not likely to be forthcoming while the political situation in
Iraq remains unstable. Even if restoration is funded, it is unlikely that the
marshes can be fully returned to their original condition. And even if
significant restoration is possible, many of the Marsh Arabs may have
drifted away or perished, although some will doubtless return. 144 In the
meantime, the best way to prevent others from suffering a similar fate is to
hold those responsible accountable under international law.

144. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 8; Spoils of War, supra note 1; Marsh Arabs,
supra note 4.

